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ABSTRACT
The focus of this paper is on the two major axes that have in-
fluenced the course of child welfare policy. One upholds corporal
punishment as the predominant method of child rearing, that is,
"Spare the rod, spoil the child." The other defines the status of
the child as property of "loving" parents. Because of these two
conceptions, the authors maintain that reliance on parental bene-
volence or the "benevolent intrusion" of the state will not suffice
to protect the child's best interests. On the contrary, the examina-
tion of the socio-legal history of child abuse and neglect highlights
the authors' warning that children will remain at the mercy of adult
authorities unless advocates commit themselves to securing Constitu-
tional safeguards of children's rights. Critical is the child's
right to counsel that the authors view as a prerequisite in changing
the legal and social power relationship between the child and the
adult.
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At the first White House Conference on Children in 1909, the
central policy recommendations were based upon the principle that
children were a precious resource to be protected and treasured.
As with so many national resources, the difference between policy
and practice has frequently resulted in abuse and exploitation.
It is the central thesis of this paper that both policy and practice
have evolved around two major axes. The first is based upon the
Biblical injunction, "He who spares his rod hates his son..."
(Proverbs, viii, 24), and its modern equivalent, "Spare the rod and
spoil the child." And the second reflects the concept of the child
as property of loving parents who are best able to provide the
benevolent protection the child needs. The result of these two
conceptions is that the socio-legal history of child welfare poli-
cies has been to leave the child vulnerable to abuse and neglect no
matter under whose jurisdictions the child fell: the family, or, as
we will see, the state. As Thomas states,
Our laws and legal systems have developed over the hundreds
of years around the expectation that parents will love and
protect (their children). Courts have been reluctant to
interfere in family government or to restrict the right of
parents to correct and discipline their children. Further,
they have given parents almost complete immunity from
civil liability for injuries to their own children (1972:
293-94).
Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century the state recog-
nized that those who held traditional legal responsibility for the
protection of children were also the frequent source of their
neglect and abuse. The sensational case of Mary Ellen (see below
for details) increased "concern and awareness" of parental abuse
of children and prompted the "benevolent intrusion" by legal
authorities under the doctrine of parens patraie as later formu-
lated in some juvenile courts. This "humanitarian" movement to
protect or to "save" the child, however, was not completely moti-
vated by altruism. It has been pointed out that the intervention
of the state on the grounds of child protection was hard to distin-
guish from the policy of social control of the "dangerous classes"
(Platt: 1969).
By the beginning of the twentieth century the emphasis was more
on family preservation and rehabilitation than it was on mere child
protection. While the state reserved the right to intervene in
only the severe cases of abuse and neglect, the assumption remained
that the natural family was the beat locus for child rearing. The
"burden" of raising a child, however, was still regarded as the
responsibility of the parents. Such parental responsibility was
interpreted through middle class standards which made the poor
particularly vulnerable to the government's "benevolent intrusion."
The general civil rights movement of the 1960's called into serious
question this class bias in child welfare policies. Nevertheless, in
the child advocacy movement the basic issues about the child's status
remained with two divergent perspectives being identified. The
issues revolve around the provision of service to children via
protective adult intervention or the establishment of children's
rights. The question comes down to whether the primary goal of
child advocates is the protection of children, with debate focusing
on whether the state or parent is best protector, or whether the goal
is children's liberation, that is, guaranteeing children the basic
rights of citizens.
From the child saving perspective, demands for increased federal
responsibility (money and supportive services) for children are
made while limitation is placed on the government's intervention
into the family unit. Parental benevolence is taken as a given
here. On the other hand, those who work for civil rights for
children contend that "human childhood inevitably provides a
potential basis for exploitation" (Gerzon, 1973:64). Children will
remain at the mercy of their families, essentially powerless, to be
rescued only by benevolent intrusion, unless fundamental guarantees
of children's rights are secured. An increase in children's power,
that is, their right to influence the decisions that affect their
lives, is the primary step in effectively balancing power among
three relevant parties; the state, the parents, and the children.
To understand just how this debate emerged and some of its implica-
tions and consequences are the objectives of the balance of this
paper.
A brief examination of our Judeo-Christian heritage reveals a
pattern that supports our harsh and chattel-like treatment of
children. In both the Old and New Testaments, one finds a basis for
(1) the attitude toward children as property, (2) the establishment
of "proprietary interest" as the basis of the child-parent relation-
ship (Fraser, 1976a:317), and (3) prescriptions of harsh child
rearing practices, and abandonment.
Even if we discount the influence of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, the pattern of child abuse finds its roots in general
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western culture. DeMause (1974) notes that during the middle ages
infanticide was comnon and persisted into the nineteenth century.
Earlier the Greeks had developed a wide number of techniques to
kill children. They were "thrown into rivers, flung into dung
heaps and cess trenches, potted jars to starve to death, exposed
on every hill and roadside" (DeMause, 1974:25). Particularly
susceptible to such practices were children who were deformed,
unwanted, and born to "inferior parents." Other forms of harsh
treatment were justified on the "reasonable" grounds that it was a
matter of necessity to keep children in their place, appease the
gods, or as the best method to educate undisciplined youth.
In the schools of Sumer, five thousand years ago, there
was a man in charge of the whip to punish boys upon the
slightest pretext... (According to religious beliefs) boys
were flogged by their parents before the altars of gods...
(And even the enlightened ancient philosophers) beat their
pupils unmercifully as the only cure for the 'foolishness
bound up on the heart of the child' (Radbil, 1965:3).
Such publicly accepted treatment was supported by laws that
legitimated the proprietary interest of the parent-child relation-
ship. Under Greek law, the child was the absolute property of the
father who had the authority to determine whether the child lived
or died. Prior to the ceremony Amphidromia, that occurred five
days after the child's birth and at which time the father's accept-
ance of the infant into the family was decided, infanticide was
quite permissible (Fraser, 1976a: 318; Thomas, 1972:294). Simi-
larly, exclusive paternal dominance was replaced in Roman Law under
the doctrine of patria potestas whereby the father's authority
over the child included infanticide, mutilation, abondonment, and
sale of his children. Although reforms were slowly enacted, so
that by 374 A.D. killing an infant was considered murder (DeMause,
1974:28) and sale of children was prohibited in 565 A.D. (Fraser,
1976a:319), the authority of the pater-familias and its practices
persisted. The strength and tenacity with which patria potestas
was supported transcend its legal status. It was deeply etched in
the norms of the society that "every family was, and of right ought
to be one body with one will and executive' (Fraser, 1976a:319).
With this brief review we can see that religiously and cultur-
ally institutionalized maltreatment and abuse placed children in
a powerless position with the family with legal sanctions upholding
the proprietary interests of the parent. This vulnerable socio-
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legal position of children in the society was intensified by an ide-
ology that endorsed corporal punishment as the predominant method
of child rearing.
English Common Law and the Emergence of Modern Child Care
Practices. England was no exception to the medieval traditions
that regarded children as property. In England, children were often
viewed in hierarchical terms where they were placed at the bottom of
the social ladder, a rung below "senile old men, foolish women, and
doddering drunks" (DeMause, 1974:229). Upholding the hierarchical
system meant that the emphasis was still on parental authority with
regard to child rearing practices that inculcated in the child
respect for his/her elders. Discipline, viewed as a moral obligation
for those parents who loved their children, was a simple variation
of the biblical theme already presented.
Parents hoped for obedience based on a rational acceptance
of their position as natural in the hierarchical system
where the king was the pater patriae for his people in the
same way a father had dominion over his wife and children.
Legally wives and children held a subordinate position;
they were merely things to be used as a father saw fit.
Whether he obtained obedience by love and affection rather
than through pain and fear by frequently administering
beatings mattered little; legally he had the right (DeMause,
1979:246).
Early English law reflected the Roman law's proprietary concept
of children to the extent that infanticide was still a sanctioned
practice if done a few days after birth (Fraser, 1976a:320-321).
Unlike Roman law, however, English law established emancipation
from the parents at the age of majority (21), and in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, there is explicit evidence that children as
persons had certain legal rights. While one cannot equate these
rights with those free choices accorded citizens, such "negative
rights" do at least recognize the child's right to be protected
from the decision making of others. For example, under the common
law, guardians appointed to handle the property of a child heir
could be sued for mismanagement "in propria persona" or with the
assistance of a "next friend" who would file a written order on
the right to appoint their own counsel, "the practice of next
friends under the supervision of the court (was).. .institutionalized
into a requirement of next friends or guardian ad litem in most
actions to which an infant is party" (Kleinfield, 1970:342). Under
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such a system, one that persists today, children's interests were
again only recognized through the adult's judgment of when the
child's best interests should be protected. "Where an infant has a
cause of action in which no sophisticated adult shares an interest,
the system provides no means for calling judicial attention to the
need to appoint representation" (Kleinfeld, 1970:345). Further, such
a system assumed that the next friend, who could be the parent-com-
plaintant, would act in the child's best interests. Even though the
judicial system was to protect the child from incompetent or dis-
honest next friends, "the infant depends upon counsel retained by
his next friend or the court to assert his rights under these rules"
(Kleinfeld, 1970:346).
The increased emphasis on private property also prompted the
state to take more than just a humanitarian interest in children
regarding such issues as protection of the child's property right
against the guardian. As heirs and potential heirs, the state
expanded its role in assuring children's rights, at least to property,
by inviting itself into the family unit under the emerging doctrine
of parens patriae. Finally, in 1259 England passed a law declaring
that "the guardian's profitable rights during his ward's infancy
(would be converted) into a trust for the benefit of the child"
Fraser, 1976a:321). Such a law provided the basis for the state to
intervene on behalf of a child, first hesitantly and only where prop-
erty was involved (Wellesley V. Beaufort, 1827) and then as a legiti-
mate third party (In Respence, 1847). The rationale for this was that:
The relationship between the parent and the child was a
trust. The right was endowed by the crown as a trust
because it was assumed that the parent would discharge
faithfully on behalf of his child. If the trust were not
faithfully discharged, it would be incumbend upon the
crown to intervene and to protect the child's interest...
The state would act as a guarantor of the trust (Fraser,
1976:332).
The transition from feudalism to capitalism was marked by an in-
creasing population and economic instability, and thus produced not
only vagrancy, but begging as the last recourse of survival. Par-
ticularly in periods of economic recession "large numbers of work-
ers (thrown out of work)--and especially their children, who were
preferred as beggars for the sympathy they elicited--recurrently
took to the streets to plead for charity, cluttering the very door-
steps of the better-off classes" (Priven & Cloward, 1971:10).
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Legislation that outlawed vagrancy and begging with harsh penalties
invoked for violations did not halt recalcitrant citizens nor
safeguard civil order. Neither could overwhelmed private charities
handle the increasing numbers needing relief. Thus, the series of
legislation outlawing vagrancy combined with the statets recognition
of a public responsibility to administer a system of relief culminated
in the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601 (Piven & Cloward, 1971:8-16;
Trattner, 1974:6-10). Basically, the act recognized the moral
responsibility and legal obligation of parents to support their
children. Thus, it authorized state intervention into the parent-
child relationship when such support was inadequate. While establish-
ing the state's residual responsibility to poor families in times of
economic hardships, such relief was usually administered by removing
the child from his home and declaring him a ward of the state. The
strong work ethic that considered idleness to be a sin against the
community and, in particular, the limited economic resources of the
time, necessitated that the state develop policies that would remove
children from the welfare roles as soon as possible. At issue was
the burden of children to the state. Thus, productive employment in
some form was considered necessary. Apprenticeships, for example,
were recognized as
an instrument of national policy...Parish overseers of the
poor were empowered to set children of indigent parents to
work... In reality what this act did was to make each parish
responsible for destitute and orphan children. It remained
on the books until 1834 (DeMause, 1974:250).
While such a policy served the interests of the state, it was
morally sanctioned... that "youth may be accustomed and brought up in
labor and work" (Piven & Cloward, 1971, p. 24). The upsurge in
the manufacturing industry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centures required a fluid and "free" labor force. As skilled
artisans and yeoman revolted against the inhuman mechanization, the-
state deemed that children needed to be "liberated" from parental
practices that kept them out of the labor force. The state ration-
alized its policies by maintaining that children needed the disci-
pline of work to become good adult members of the society. The state
would be remiss in its responsibilites if it did not make such train-
ing and discipline available--particularly for the lower classes.
Indigent parish children, therefore, were regularly sought as the
"ideal" source of labor.
Manufacturers negotiated regularly with the parish authorities,
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ordering lots of fifty or more children from the poorhouses...
To secure their acquiescence, the youngsters were told that
once at the cotton mills or ironmongers they would live like
ladies and gentlemen onroast beef and plum pudding...
Moreover, pauper children could be had for a bit of food and
a bed, and they provided a very stable labor supply, for they
were held fast at their labor by indentures, usually until
they were twenty-one (Piven and Cloward, 1971:27-28).
In the name of its benevolent interest in paupers and orphans, the
state sentenced children to work in the mills for sixteen hours a
day, "sometimes with irons riveted around their ankles to keep them
from running away. They were starved, beaten, and.. .succombed to
occupational diseases while others committed suicide" (Radbill, 1965:
12). Even child labor reforms, notably led by Robert Owen and Sir
Robert Peel and culminating in the Factory Act of 1802 that outlawed
the "pauper apprentice system", did not halt this exploitation of
children. Such laws applied only to state wards. Unfortunately, it
proved in the parents' best interests to invoke their proprietary
rights and send their children to work in the mills under the same
conditions while pocketing their earnings (Radbill, 1965:12; Fraser,
1967a:323).
English law therefore reflects variations of a paternal attitude
toward children that can probably best be understood by comparing the
paternalist view of Thomas Hobbes with that of John Lock (Worsfold,
1974). Writing in the seventeenth century, Hobbes judged children's
value only through their servitude to the father. Reflecting the
Roman doctrine of patria potestas, his writings upheld the ides of
absolute paternal dominance with the basis of the parent-child rela-
tionship being one of fear. As DeMause described this relationship
in medieval England "Legally, wives and children... were merely
things to be used as a father saw fit. Whether be obtained obedience
...through pain and fear.. .mattered little" (1974:246). Hobbes
suggests that there would be no reason to have children unless they
had some utility to the parent, It was a relationship of "mutual
benefit" that existed between parent and child whereby a child invol-
untarily exchanged protection for submission and strict obedience
to the father (Worsfold, 1974:144).
From the Hobbesian view, such protection was equated with harsh
treatment that was recognized as being for the child's own good.
"The child whom the father loves most dear he does most punish ten-
derly in fear" was a popular adage of the fifteenth and sixteenth
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centuries CDelause, 1974:245). Locke's writing later in the seven-
teenth century modified Hobbe's strict utilitarian view to one of
benevolent protection. Locke recognized childrents duty to honor
their parents but did not view parental authority as one of unlim-
ited discretion in the treatment of children. Locke considered
children to have natural rights that entitled them to protection
through parental benevolence (Worsfold, 1974:144-145). While up-
holding this as foremost a parental responsibility, the English
law also came to recognize the state's claim in the proprietary
interest. As the socio-legal history of England illustrated,
whether the period's attitudes toward children approached the strict
utilitarian view of Hobbes or the benevolent protection one of Locke,
the results of either form of paternalism were similar. In both,
the intent of control and the potential for abuse are evident,
Indeed, when one examines the results, it is hard to distinguish be-
tween admonishments "to punish in fear" and a policy that encouraged
similar abuses in child labor by subordinating children's best
interests to those of their self-appointed protectors, be they the
parents or the state.
The Development of America's Policy of Paternalism
America's treatment of children closely paralleled that of
England with their history reflecting a "softening" of the harsh
utilitarian attitude to one of benevolent protection.
Early America. Since the colonists modeled their legal system
on the Common Law of England, "the common law rules of family gov-
ernment and the traditions and child-care practices of the Eliza-
bethan Poor Law, including the idea that poverty was a sin" (Thomas,
1972:299), were inherent features, The common law of family gov-
ernment recognized the parents' proprietary interest in children.
Children were to be a "credit" to their parents by having a God-
fearing character, through diligent labor, by assuming the caretakay
role in their parents' old age, and by becoming exemplary carriers
of the culture (DeMause, 1974:360-363). The relationship of mutual
benefit was evident, since these services by children entitled them
to their father's support, protection, and control. Administering
discipline was an inherent part of these duties, and parents were
warned against becoming too fond or familiar with their children,
since this bred contempt and undermined parental authority. Absolute
obedience was enforced through a variety of ways that upheld the
Biblical sanctions. The rod, the whip, "foul tasting medicines,...
the dark closet... other painful forms of healing such as bleeding,
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and "the blisters" were widely employed as necessary means to thwart
the evil inclinations of the child and "deliver his soul from hell"
(Demause, 369-370; 328). Such duties emanated from the legal
rights of the father that were regarded as the "discharge of a
sacred trust.. .the true foundation of parental power" (Bremner, 1970:
364). As in England, Bremner continues, the state was "guarantor
of this trust".
"although" the father is entitled to the custody of the
infant children, inasmuch as they are their natural pro-
tectors, for maintenance and education..., the courts of
justice may in their sound discretion, and when the
morals, or safety, or interests of the children strongly
require it, withdraw the infants from the custody of the
father.. .and place the care and custody of them elsewhere.
Rather than the courts intervening on the side of the children,
however, the laws usually upheld severe child rearing methods. For
example, laws of Biblical origin, going so far as to invoke the
death penalty for a child who cursed his father (Haves, 1971:13) or
acts, such as the Stubborn Child Act of 1628, that identified rebel-
lion against the parent as a crime (Sidman, 1972:33-35) proved the
rule rather than the exception. In the spirit of the Elizabethan
Poor Law with its peculiar disdain for idleness, the state was be-
ginning to assume responsibility for children when parental duty was
inadequate or negligent. Usually, inadequacy and negligence were
defined as too many waifs and destitute children begging on the
streets. Folks (1911) cites an early Massachusetts statute (1735)
that sought to remedy the increase in the idle and the poor. Accord-
ing to the statute,
"persons that" were unable, or neglected to provide
necessaries for the sustenance and support of their
children...and where persons bring up their children
in such gross ignorance that they do not know or are
not able to distinguish the alphabet, or (allow them
to grow up to be idle beggars), the overseers might
bind out such children to good families for a decent
and christian education (Folks, 1911:167-168).
Besides binding out or apprenticeship, commitment to poor houses was
a legally sanctioned method of child care during the eighteenth cen-
tury that was well established by 1825 (Folks, 1911; Thomas, 1972).
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Beginnings of the Child Saving Movement. Several commentators
(Folks, 1911; Costin, 1973; Thomas, 1972) cite 1825 as the beginning
of a public recognition of not only the duty but the right of author-
ities to intervene in circumstances of severe parental abuse and
neglect. While espousing the state's benevolent interest in protec-
ting the child, the early child savers were also motivated by a fear
of juvenile crime and, subsequently, a necessity to control the
children of the "dangerous classes" (Platt, 1969).
By the second decade of the nineteenth century, the middle class
was perturbed enough by the growing number of children "of poor and
abandoned parents.. .brought up in perfect ignorance and idleness,
and what is worse in the street begging and pilfering" (Hawnes, 1971:
28) to institutionalize efforts to rescue them. Recognizing that
almshouses and penitentiaries, where impressionable youth were min-
gled with adult criminals and paupers, were only "nurseries of crime",
the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism established a separate
children's asylum. The New York House of Refuge would be:
an asylum in which boys under a certain age, who became
subject to the notice of the Police, either as vagrants,
or homeless, or charged with petty crimes, may be received
...and then put to work at such employments as will tend
to encourage industry and ingenuity (Hawes, 1971:38).
By the end of the 1820's, incorporation of Houses of Refuge had
taken place in Boston (1826) and Philadelphia (1828). In the
following decade, however, the constitutionality of the state's
benevolence in committing destitute, neglected, and vagrant children
to such reformatories was challenged. Commonwealth v. M'Keagy (1831)
upheld the public's power to "assume guardianship of children whose
poverty had degenerated into vagrancy" (Hawes, 1971:58). Likewise,
Ex parte Crouse (1839) recognized the state's power of parens
patriae in defining parental negligence and subsequently "snatching
(the child) from a course which must have ended in confirmed deprav-
ity." Thus, the laws sanctioned not only more reformatories but
also state intervention in arbitrarily determined situations of
parental negligence.
Between 1860-1900, one of the critical issues aroused by the
move towards urbanization and industrialization was the maintenance
of social control. Symptomatic of the extraordinary growth and in-
dustrialization of the cities and its even more overwhelming increase
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in population, were the disorganizing and dehumanizing elements of
urban life, epitomized by the city slum. Particularly vulnerable
to the astrophy of the city slums were the children who were describ-
ed as "intelligent dwarfs"...physical and moral wrecks whose
characters were predominantly shaped by their physical surroundings"
(Platt, 1969:40). The assumption that a child in such an environ-
ment would be strongly tempted to enter a life of crime seemed a
foregone conclusion. Constant editorializing by the newspapers
strengthened the credibility of the relationship between delinquency
and the slums. Thus, the increased number of indigent children in
the city streets, in particular, the activities of local gangs, posed
alarming problems in terms of maintaining social control. Already
overburdened city administrations could not respond to the urgent
public cry do do something. Maintenance of social control, there-
fore, became the responsibility of private charitable associations.
The leaders of these associations and the subsequent child saving
movement were members of the middle class. This problem of social
control, therefore was frequently defined in class terms and middle-
class reformers interested in child welfare issued class rhetoric
as part of their strategy to introduce new programs. Charles Loring
Brace, for example, felt his "responsibility to God for.. .this great
multitude of unhappy, deserted and degraded boys and girls" (Brace,
1894, p.3). Brace, however, also considered the threat the children
of the poor lower classes posed to the order of middle-class society.
"The immense vat of misery and crime and filth in New York challenges
one to think of ten thousand children growing up almost sure to be
prostitutes and rogues" (1893, 82). Based upon this interpretation
of linking urbanization and deliquency he recommended the "placing
out" of children in the west, for not only saving these lower class
children but also of controlling the dangerous classes. By 1884,
the network of Children's Aid Societies claimed the "placing out" of
over 60,000 children (Hawes, 1971:102).
We can now consider the case of Mary Ellen. The literature
(Kaudushin, 1967; Radbill, 1965; Bremner, 1971; Thomas, 1972; Fontana,
1973) records the sensationalized case of Mary Ellen and subsequent
formation of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
as the origin of Child Protective Services. According to these re-
ports, the plight of Mary Ellen had been discovered by Ellen Wheeler
"who had been on an errand of mercy to a dying woman in the house
adjoining, the latter asserting that she could not die happy until
she had made the child's treatment known" (Bremner, 1971:186). As
the trial of the little girl's foster mother revealed, Mary Ellen was
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whipped almost every day until her body was now severely bruised; she
was extremely undernorished and usually confined to her bedroom, some-
times chained to the bedpost. Ms. Wheeler's efforts to arouse action
by the authorities proved futile since legally they were not empowered
to supersede the sacred right of the parents to discipline their child
as they deemed fit. As a last recourse, Ellen Wheeler appealed to
Henry Bergh of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
With the legal assistance of Elbridge T. Gerry, he initiated court
action to have the child removed on the grounds that she was a member
of the animal kingdom and therefore entitled to the humane treatment
accorded other animals. The case generated public outrage that active
concern for the humane treatment of animals antedated that of children.
Thus, in 1875, the first Society for the prevention of Cruelty to Chil-
dren, the forerunner of Child Protective Services, was established in
New York. Fraser, like others, regards the case as signalling:
(a) that children do have a right of not being cruelly
and inhumanely treated; (b) the advent of and impetus
for a number of privately funded charities whose task
it was to protect children; and (c) the beginning of
an era that would see every state adopt neglect stat-
utes to protect children (1976a: 324-325).
In addition to this, however, when one examines some of the facts
of the case, rather than its appealing "mythical" version, the neg-
ligence of the state's child saving practices is pointedly exposed
(Thomas, 1972: 308-309). As revealed in testimony at the trial,
the Superintendent of Charities and Correction had indentured the
abandoned child to Thomas and Mary McCormack (Bremner, 1971: 187-
188). The placement was made on the basis of a single reference,
the McCormack's family physician, and without the Department's
knowledge that Mary Ellen was actually the illegitimate child of
Thomas McCormack. The conditions of the indenture required that
the McCormack's not only "instruct the child.. .that there is a God
and what it is to lie" but that they also report on the child's
condition yearly to the Superintendent's Office. According to test-
imony by the former Mary McCormack, now Mary Connolly, she had re-
ported only twice in twelve years to the Superintendent who had about
500 children "passed through his department... (with) no recollec-
tion of (Mary Ellen) other than the records of his office record"
(Thomas, 1972: 188). While Mary Connally was sentenced to one year
in the Penitentiary at hard labor, Mary Ellen was committed to an
orphan asylum, "The Sheltering Arms," as the search for the little
girl's grandparents continued. In spite of this insight, the court and
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media focused on the shocking parental abuse of the child, over-
shadowing the contributor negligence on the part of state placement
agencies. Overwhelmingly supported, the New York Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (N.Y.S.P.C.C.) was to have
primarily a preventive law enforcement orientation unlike previous
Children's Aid Societies or asylums that took care of children only
after the court placement with the agency. Their mission, according
to its President Elbridge Gerry, was to:
seek out and rescue from the dens and slums of the city
the little unfortunates whose lives were rendered miserable
by the system of cruelty and abuse which was constantly
practiced upon them by the human brutes who happened to
possess the custody or control of them (Bremner, 1971:180).
This mandate as a law enforcement agency and subsequent exemption
from supervision by the State Board of Charities, gave the N.Y.S.P.
C.C. powerful control over the lives of poor, neglected, and immi-
grant children. This control was manifested chiefly by disposing
of the abused and abandoned in asylums. In such asylums, however,
the latitudes taken by those acting in loco parentis to protect
children from the "sin of idleness" often resulted in even greater
physical abuse (James, 1975).
It was 1899 with the passage of first the Juvenile Court Act
in the State of Illinois that this system of protective control
was institutionalized. The Juvenile Court was to be an unusual
legal institution that, operating under the power of parens patriae,
would act as a guardian with the best interests of the child in mind.
However, in its intent to protect the child from evil, it was used
as a legitimate instrument of control and perpetrated a different
form of child abuse. As Platt comments: "Although the child
savers' attitudes to youth were often paternalistic and romantic,
their commands were backed up by force and an abiding faith in the
benevolence of government" (1971: sv-xvi).
The Child Saving Movement v. The Children's Rights Movement
The Twentieth Century: State's Rights v. Parent's Rights
The twentieth century was marked by controversy over the doctrine
of parens patraie. In the beginning of the 1900's, this contro-
versy was generated by the apprehension that perhaps the "benevo-
lence of government intrusion" treaded too closely on the sacred
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rights of parents. The socio-legal history of children in this
century can be regarded as a perpetual conflict to strike a balance
in the precarious relationship between state's rights and parents'
rights. Children, presumed incapable of determining their own
best interests, looked on as the paternalistic policy of protection
resulted in a constant exchange of one master for the other.
The changing focus of protective services indicates that
"almost from the start another orientation less legalistic and more
social was evident.. .that the rationale was to help parents, not to
punish them, to keep the family together rather than disrupt it"
(Kadushin, 1967: 207). Spurred by the developing science of child
psychology that emphasized the importance of the home to the child,
this exchange was undertaken, again in the name of the child's best
interests. An examination of the parent-child immunity legislation,
however, reveals more of a legal reaffirmation of the parental right
to control the child rather than renewed efforts on his/her behalf.
One can speculate that perhaps the middle class reformers were dis-
turbed by the seriousness and tenacity of the N.Y.S.P.C.C.'s child
rescuing efforts, and attempted to make sure that such activity was
confined to the visible lower class.
According to Andell, "three State supreme court cases estab-
lished the parent-child immunity rule as American common law"
(1970: 98). In Hewellette v. George (1891), the Mississippi Supreme
Court established that a minor cannot sue his parent for negligent
tort. Dismissing the suit brought by a daughter against her mother
for malicious committment to a mental institution, the court stated:
So long as the parent is under obligation to care for,
guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal
obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action
as this can be maintained.. .a sound public policy de-
signed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society, forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim
to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at
the hands of the parent. (9 So. 887, Miss. 1891, as
quoted in Galligan, 1972: 50).
This case set the precedent for McKelvey v. McKelvey (1903) in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed a child's tort against
her stepmother and father for assault and also for Roller v. Roller
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(1905) in which the Washington Supreme Court denied a suit by a
daughter against her father for raping her (Andell, 1970: 99;
Calligan, 1972: 50-51). Many other jurisdictions followed this
example, justifying the doctrine on the grounds of family preserv-
ation and protection of parental authority. As the courts pointed
out: "in a democracy like ours, the government of a well-ordered
home is one of the surest bulwarks against the forces that make for
social disorder" (Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 15, N.C. 1923 as
quoted in Galligan, 1972: 52). It was further argued that the
parental right to raise one's children had a constitutional basis
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Statutes outlawing the teaching of German in schools (Meyer v.
Nebraska, 1922) or requirements that parents must send their
children to public schools (Pierce v. Sister Society, 1925) were
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court as violations of the parents'
Constitutional rights. These cases were cited later as the basis
for reaffirming the sanctity of the family with State encroachment
upon parental rights prompted only by "showing a subordinating
interest that is compelling" (Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524, 1960 as quoted in 70 Columbia Law Review 471, 1970). While
reaffirming the parents' rights, such legislation did not restore
them to a state of absolutism.
In its place, the concept of presumptive parental
rights has arisen.. .American society presumes that
a child's parent(s) wants to act in the child's
best interests. It further presumes that a parent
does act in his child's best interest.. .if there is
an intervention, the state must show an immediate
and pressing danger to the child or to the inter-
ests of the state (Fraser, 1976a: 325-326).
Indeed, cases followed that indicated a slow erosion in the absolute
parent-child immunity doctrine (Galligan, 1972; 19 Hastings Law
Journal 201, 1967; Andell, 1970). Some of the cases (Dunlop v.
Dunlop, 1930; Worrell v. Worrell, 1939; Signs v. Signs, 1952) were
premised on business negligence and regarded as being outside the
parent-child relationship: the suit being between the child and
the insurance company 19 Hastings Law Journal 205, 1967). However,
others (Cowgill v. Brock, 1950; Emery v. Emery, 1955; Goller v.
White, 1963; Hoffman v. Tracy, 1965; Briere v. Briere, 1966;
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 1969) were based specifically on the presump-
tion of parental responsibility and cited negligent or malicious
behavior as justification for abandonment of immunity in total or
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part (19 Hastings Law Journal 201, 1967; Galligan, 1972; Andell,
1970).
Such legislation abrogating the absolute parent-child immunity
was prompted by the medical and social breakthroughs of the late
fifties and early sixties. According to Radbill "Abuse of children
has excited periodic waves of sympathy, each rising to a high pitch
and then curiously subsiding until the next period of excitation"
(1965: 18). This period of excitation was triggered by the neophyte
science of pediatric radiology. Although X-rays of infants were
taken as early as 1906, it was not until almost thirty years later
that detailed reports regarding the radiographic features of infant
bone injuries and healing became evident. Contributing to the
association of such injuries with willful trauma were
the bizarre radiographic manifestations of recovery
from epiphyseal separation during breech extraction
...reported by Snedescor and his associated (and)
articles on unusual periosteal reactions in children
which were to be differentiated from congenital
syphilis (Silverman, 1974: 41-42).
Finally, in 1946, Caffey, upon observation of abnormal changes in
the long bones, voiced the obvious implications of such findings.
In 1955, Dr. Wooley and Dr. Evan's eight year study and subsequent
observation that such traumatic lesions were willfully inflicted
were relayed via the media to a subsequently shocked yet somewhat
disbelieving public (Radbill, 1965, p. 18). These radiographic
indications of an abused child, however, were so specific that
when no advocate could be found "they spoke for the child who is
unable or unwilling to speak for himself and served to alert the
physician to a hazard of considerable magnitude that threatens the
life and limb as well as the emotional and intellectual potenti-
alities of the child" (Silverman, 1974: 58). Finally, in the 1960's,
an adult advocate, Dr. C. Henry Kempe, was urged to action by his
observation of the high number of children admitted to his pediatric
center with similar unexplainable injuries. Coining the term "bat-
tered child syndrome", he launched a nationwide survey of hospitals
and law enforcement agencies in an effort to determine the extent
of the abuse. His efforts focused national attention on the phe-
nomenal extent of child abuse and exposed the myth that parents
always act in their child's best interests. As a result, between
1963-1967, states enacted legislation that encouraged the reporting
of suspected cases of abused children.
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In addition to this medically based contribution, the emergence
of children's rights was in conjunction with the times. During the
1960's, it was consumers' smoldering discontent with corporations'
unresponsiveness and lack of accountability; it was the growing
disillusionment with a government who had plunged its country into
an unjust war; most of all, it was the mounting oppression of minor-
ity groups that culminated and erupted into a movement for social
justice. During the era of Johnson's Great Society, the country
witnessed a renewed commitment to the rights of the individual re-
gardless of race, sex, sexual orientation, or political stance.
Also emphasized was the responsibility of the government to expand
services to disadvantaged groups while at the same time recognizing
their right to self-determination and participatory democracy. Such
aspirations were manifested in consumer protection groups, civil
rights legislation, the War on Poverty, anti-war demonstrations,
equal opportunity legislation, and increased unionization.
Clearly inspired by the attitudes of the 1960's-erosin
of faith in any authority, parents' included; the move-
ments that view all consumers, including children, as
having some right to determine what happens to them;
and the generally increased awareness of civil rights
and civil liberties (Keniston, 1977: 184).
Advocacy was identified as "intervention on behalf of children re-
lative to those services and institutions that impinge on their
lives" (Kahn, Kameron, & McGowan, 1972; 63). Its proposed targets
were to be those systems that undermined the family unit. Based on
the recognition of the increasing dependence of families on govern-
ment services and entitlements (Advisory Committee on Child Devel-
opment, 1976), advocates attempted to assist parents in coping with
the health, education, and welfare systems, courts and correctional
agencies. Thus, as summarized by Kahn, et. al. from their national
baseline study:
Child advocacy represents a shift.. .Whereas child
welfare agencies and child protective services seek
children's welfare by intervening in the parent-
child relationship or by substituting for it, child
advocacy intervenes into the larger social environ-
ment and those institutions that impinge on children's
lives (1972: 67).
-866-
Internal Conflict in Child Advocacy. While confrontations by adver-
sary groups like the businesses and traditional service organizations
were expected by advocates, the bitter internal conflict regarding
what constitutes the child's best interests was only hazily foreseen.
Now it is quite evident that "child advocates fall into two obviously
related groups whose goals both overlap and conflict: on the one
hand there are those who are interested in protecting children's
rights" (Farson, 1974: 9). In examining the child protection orien-
tation of advocacy, one can identify a strong commitment to restrict
government interference into the parent-child relationship. It is
presumed that the child's best interests lie in a strengthened
family unit. Particularly, advocates perceive the resurrection of
yesterday's child savers through child abuse and neglect reporting
laws that have the legal potential to terminate the parental rights
of the poor. The arguments presented by this group are well-founded
as witnessed by past history. As pointed out, one articulated pur-
pose of the child abuse legislation was "to stabilize the home en-
vironment, to preserve the family life whenever possible" (Education
Commission of the States, 1975: 9). As noted later, however, "Keep-
ing the family unit intact is not the primary purpose of the legis-
lation. Protection of the child takes first priority." The impli-
cation of this latter provision, for lower-class families in parti-
cular, becomes apparent when the ramifications of the loose and
ambiguous definitions of child abuse and neglect are examined. As
Katz adequately interprets this: "Child neglect occurs when the
expectations of parenthood that are dominant in our culture are not
met... (it) oonnotes a parent's conduct that results in a failure to
provide for the child's needs as defined by the preferred values
of the community" (1971: 22). Such definitions are handily filtered
through a middle class value system beginning with reported community
perceptions, with their subsequent enforcement through traditional
socio-legal institutions personified by the judge who is granted
broad discretion in interpreting the statutes. As some authors
(Katz, 1971; Keniston, 1977) point out it is the visible poor because
of their reliance on public service agencies, particularly, in this
case, public health clinics, that brings them under the purview of
society's scrutiny. It is their living conditions, their children's
appearance; acting in the "best interests of the child" can impose
their norms of morality and ubringing upon families.. .Most families
accused of abuse and neglect are minority families with low incomes,
often "one parent" (1977: 187). Sometimes however, this eagerness
to protect the child may cloak punitive attempts to regulate "unde-
sirable" adult behavior that has little to do with one's performance
in the parental role. Thus, the family's receipt and management of
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government assistance in the visits by the child protective worker with-
out regard to the mother's constitutionally based claim that such
accompanying "service" is unwanted and unnecessary (Burt, 1971).
Finally, when parental rights are terminated in the child's best inter-
ests it usually means an exchange of masters. The result is even worse
abuse and neglect in state institutions (James, 1975) or consignment
to the "endless limbo of foster care" (Polier, 1977: 505).
While citing biased reporting laws and prosecution of poor parents,
these advocates also accuse the present social service system, in
particular, the child welfare system of contributory negligence.
Charges of inaccessibility, fragmentation of services, inadequate per-
formance, and lack of accountability are well founded. As one advocate
put it: "Child welfare may mean foster homes of institutional care
only, but not the generally conceded needed diversity of support to
help families stay together" (Kahn, 1974: 6). Such advocates are
committed to a comprehensive national policy for families that include
the families right to an adequate income and to comprehensive support
services from a responsive and integrated service delivery system
(Advisory Committee on Child Development, 1976: 4-5). These are in-
deed necessary efforts in securing a child's right to economic se-
curity. Such singularly focused efforts, however, ignore a crucial
complimentary dimension in a children's rights policy. The policy of
parental rights are to be maintained. While several comentators
(Gil, 1970; Brown & Daniels, 1968; Mulford & Cohen, 1968; Young, 1964;
Sattin & Miller, 1971) cite the sometimes overwhelming pressures of
poverty as a cause of child abuse, one cannot presume that if there
were no poverty there would be no child abuse or neglect. Indeed,
national indices support the fact that this learned response, rather
than being an anomaly or a lower class phenomenon, is quite common.
Even though "our society protects the privacy of large numbers of
families, particularly those in the middle and upper classes... This
does not mean that middle and upper class parents do not neglect (or
abuse) their children" (Katz, 1971: 23-24). In spite of this and other
difficulties in obtaining accurate national indices, Light (1973)
estimated an annual rate of 200,000 to 500,000 cases of physical
abuse in addition to 465,000 to 1,175,000 cases of severe neglect
or sexual molestation. Proportionately, this means "approximately
one child in every hundred in America is physically abused, sexually
molested, or severely neglected" (Light, 1973: 567). As Gil (1970),
Bakan (1971), and Walters (1975) argue, the physical and sexual abuse
of children is the "logical outgrowth" of a society that incorporates
physical force as a method for rearing and controlling an extremely
little valued part of our population. As Steele suggests: "abusing
parents are characterized by the implementation of the culturally
accepted goal (in "civilizing" the child) and... this style of paren-
tal behavior.. .can be considered "culture bound" in the sense that it
is widespread and is passed from one generation to the next as a
socially useful pattern" (1968: 453). It has already been documented
how our culture and history, beginning with our Judeo-Christian
heritage, sanctions the harsh and chattel-like treatment of children.
Even with a policy of social entitlements for the family, the child
is still legally considered to be in the care of his parents or the
care of the state, and not as belonging to himself. Thus, legally,
parental care could be exercised in the form of slapping, yanking,
and choosing not to "spare the rod and spoil the child."
Given then, our cultural predisposition to violence, the accept-
able use of physical force in our child rearing practices, and the
powerless position consigned to children in relation to adults, one
can expect the incidence of child abuse and neglect to grow unless
there is a reevaluation of what is being done in children's best
interests. Children's advocates must begin with the premise that
"human childhood provides a potential basis for exploitation..."
(Gerzon, 1973: 64). The chief priority then is to change the power-
less position of children in relationship to adult authorities.
Gamson points out:
The greater the inverse relation between the amount of
resources controlled and the amount of discontent
among potential partisans, the freer the authorities
are from influence. In short, they are most free
when those with the most discontent have the least
ability to influence (1968: 114).
According to Gamaon's social psychological model of power, children's
power can be viewed as their ability to exert influence on the
decisions made by adult authorities. The basis of such influence or
resource must "be controlled by the influencer...(also) he must be
able to bring it to bear on authorities in interaction with them"
(1968: 73). Continuing to operate on a policy of paternal benevo-
lence and granting children social resources via their parents will
not really increase the child's basis of influence. The previous
examination of this policy indicated that the appointed protectors
cannot be trusted to know and act in children's best interests. It
has been clear throughout our history that protection without legal
rights is only another form of absolute social control. Decisions
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in Miranda v. State of Arizona (1965) where a suspected criminal was
denied the rights of the accused and Lessard v. Schmidt (Wisconsin,
1972) that dealt with the unconstitutional committment of the mentally
ill, indicate the court's awareness that worse abuses will result un-
less an individual's Constitutional rights are guaranteed. Therefore,
the critical factor in establishing a basis of influence for children
is legal recognition of their Constitutional rights as citizens. The
landmark decision of In re Gault (387 U.S. 1, 1967) is considered to
be the keystone of the children's rights movement (U.S. News and World
Report, 1974: 207). Gerald Gault, tried in the juvenile court, had
been committed until his majority (6 years) for a crime (making lewd
telephone calls) that for an adult would have resulted in a $5 to $55
fine and a maximum sentence of two months (Richette, 1969: 296-300).
In protecting the youth's best interests, the Arizona juvenile court
denied Gerald the following: (a) notice in writing of the charges
against him; (b) the right to be represented by a lawyer; (c) guarantee
of the right to cross examine hostile witnesses; (d) guarantee against
self-incrimination (Richette, 1969: 299). In reviewing the decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "neither the fourteenth amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone;" a child is entitled to
his rights of due process when his liberty is in jeopardy. While In
re Gault was a milestone for the children's rights movement, it did not
go far enough. In particular, In re Gault guaranteed the child inde-
pendent representation by counsel only in criminal cases where he is
in danger of incarceration (Kleinfeld, 1970; Fraser, 1976 a & b). It
was not until 1977 in Kremens v. Bartley that the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that a child facing commitment to a mental institution was
entitled to the same constitutional safeguards. Up to this time,
some 38 states had laws supporting the parents' "right" to commit
their child as a "voluntary" patient (Ferleger, 1977: 89). The
Bartley court decision finally recognized that "because parents'
may at times be acting against the interest of their children,"
the constitutional guarantees possessed by all adults in civil-
commitment proceedings extend also to juveniles" (Ferleger, 1977:
91).
In re Gault also did little in providing counsel when, instead
of his liberty, the child's health (both emotional and physical)
and his life were endangered (Fraser, 1976b: 21). In civil cases,
that is divorce/custody, adoption, and abuse and neglect proceedings,
the traditional guardian ad litem system is still employed on the
presumption that the adult, be it claimant, defendant, or state,
adequately represents the child's interests. Slowly, however, the
child's emotional vulnerability to a break in the continuity of the
pyschological parent-child's relationship (Goldstein, Freud, Solnit,
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1973) began to be recognized. As guidelines for placement decisions
in divorce proceedings, a few states now legally consider the child's
need for individual representation. Regarding cases of child abuse
and neglect, when proceedings are initiated under the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (1974), it is mandatory that the court
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child (Education Com-
mission of the States, 1975: 59). There are, however, few guide-
lines as to the qualifications of such persons and it is not a re-
quirement that the guardian ad litem be an attorney (ECS, 1975;
Fraser, 1976b).
In conclusion, children's rights advocates are attempting to
develop carefully a complete children's rights policy on the basis
of such Constitutional safeguards. On the one hand, there are
advocates like John Holt or Richard Farson who think that all rights,
privileges, and responsibilities of adult citizens should be extended
to children. On the other, there are those like Marian Wright Edel-
man, director of the Children's Defense Fund, who believes that this
is a narrow focus that does not consider the special needs of chil-
dren'. Developing a policy that incorporates these different grada-
tions of children's rights is a long and difficult undertaking.
There is consensus, however, that a children's right to counsel is
critical in the children's rights movement. Not only is the right
important in a legal context, since "without counsel, rights not
only fail to be vindicated; they fail also to be created" (Kleinfeld,
1970: 324), it is important for its subtle but powerful social im-
plications. This legal recognition of a child's right to be heard
and voice his preferences implies that adults will at the very least
have to listen to and hopefully talk with the child. Increased
communication might then change the trust dimension and thus be
reflected in the power relationship between the parent and the child.
From the child's perspective, he/she is accorded greater influence
over decisions that affect his/her life. From the adult perspective,
there is a% increased likelihood that control when implemented will
be in the form of persuasion rather than physical constraint. Hope-
fully, such a commitment to protection of children's rights will
move us in this direction---beyond the use of adult perceptions alone
in deciding the best interests of children.
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